Persuasion: Empirical Evidence
Stefano DellaVigna and
Matthew Gentzkow
No 15298, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
We provide a selective survey of empirical evidence on the effects as well as the drivers of persuasive communication. We consider persuasion directed at consumers, voters, donors, and investors. We organize our review around four questions. First, to what extent does persuasion affect the behavior of each of these groups? Second, what models best capture the response to persuasive communication? In particular, we distinguish information-based models from preference-based models. Third, what are persuaders' incentives and what limits their ability to distort communications? Finally, what evidence exists on the equilibrium outcomes of persuasion in economics and politics?
JEL-codes: D03 D11 D21 G14 L00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
Note: AP IO LS PE POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)
Published as Stefano DellaVigna & Matthew Gentzkow, 2010. "Persuasion: Empirical Evidence," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 2(1), pages 643-669, 09.
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