Credit Default Swaps and the Empty Creditor Problem

Patrick Bolton and Martin Oehmke

No 15999, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Commentators have raised concerns about the empty creditor problem that arises when a debtholder has obtained insurance against default but otherwise retains control rights in and outside bankruptcy. We analyze this problem from an ex-ante and ex-post perspective in a formal model of debt with limited commitment, by comparing contracting outcomes with and without credit default swaps (CDS). We show that CDS, and the empty creditors they give rise to, have important ex-ante commitment benefits: By strengthening creditors' bargaining power they raise the debtor's pledgeable income and help reduce the incidence of strategic default. However, we also show that lenders will over-insure in equilibrium, giving rise to an inefficiently high incidence of costly bankruptcy. We discuss a number of remedies that have been proposed to overcome the inefficiency resulting from excess insurance.

JEL-codes: G3 G33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-05
Note: CF
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published as Patrick Bolton & Martin Oehmke, 2011. "Credit Default Swaps and the Empty Creditor Problem," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(8), pages 2617-2655.

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Journal Article: Credit Default Swaps and the Empty Creditor Problem (2011)
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