Holdouts in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Theory of Negotiation in a Weak Contractual Environment

Rohan Pitchford and Mark Wright

No 16632, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Why is it difficult to restructure sovereign debt in a timely manner? In this paper we present a theory of the sovereign debt restructuring process in which delay arises as individual creditors hold-up a set- tlement in order to extract greater payments from the sovereign. We then use the theory to analyze recent policy proposals aimed at ensuring equal repayment of creditor claims. Strikingly, we show that such collective action policies may increase delay by encouraging free-riding on negotiation costs, even while preventing hold-up and reducing total negotiation costs. A calibrated version of the model can account for observed delays, and finds that free riding is quantitatively relevant: whereas in sim- ple low-cost debt restructuring operations collective mechanisms will reduce delay by more than 60%, in high-cost complicated restructurings the adoption of such mechanisms results in a doubling of delay.

JEL-codes: D23 D78 F34 K12 K33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-12
Note: IFM
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published as Rohan Pitchford & Mark L. J. Wright, 2012. "Holdouts in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Theory of Negotiation in a Weak Contractual Environment," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 79(2), pages 812-837.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Holdouts in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Theory of Negotiation in a Weak Contractual Environment (2012)
Working Paper: HOLDOUTS IN SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING: A THEORY OF NEGOTIATION IN A WEAK CONTRACTUAL ENVIRONMENT (2008)
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