What Makes a Tax Evader?

Marcelo Bergolo, Martin Leites, Ricardo Perez-Truglia and Matias Strehl

No 28235, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Why do some individuals evade taxes while others do not? We study this question using administrative tax records from Uruguay linked to a tailored survey of taxpayers. Using third-party reports, we measure individual income under-reporting as an indicator of evasion. We then examine how three factors predict who evades: social preferences (e.g., honesty measured through incentivized laboratory games), peers (e.g., the behavior of current and former coworkers), and economic factors (e.g., the marginal tax rate). We find that social preferences have little power to predict evasion, while economic factors matter more and peer behavior is the strongest predictor.

JEL-codes: H24 H26 K42 Z1 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cwa, nep-iue, nep-lam, nep-pbe, nep-pub and nep-soc
Note: LE PE
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