Web of Power: How Elite Networks Shaped War and Politics in China

Ying Bai, Ruixue Jia and Jiaojiao Yang

No 28667, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Scholars have argued that powerful individuals can exert influence on the path of a nation’s development. Yet, the process through which individuals can have an effect on macro-level political economy outcomes remains unclear. This study uses the deadliest civil war in modern history, the Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864), to elucidate how one individual—Zeng Guofan—employed his personal elite networks to organize an army to suppress the rebellion, and how these networks would affect the nation’s power distribution. Two findings stand out: (i) counties that already had more pre-war elites in Zeng’s networks experienced an increase in soldier deaths after he took power; and (ii) post-war political power shifted significantly toward the home counties of these very elites, creating a less balanced national-level power distribution. Our findings highlight how micro-level elite networks can influence national politics and societal power distribution, shedding new light on the relationship between elites, war and the state.

JEL-codes: D74 H11 L14 N45 O11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his, nep-net and nep-pke
Note: DEV POL
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Published as Ying Bai & Ruixue Jia & Jiaojiao Yang, 2023. "Web of Power: How Elite Networks Shaped War and Politics in China," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol 138(2), pages 1067-1108.

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