Does Combating Corruption Reduce Clientelism?

Gustavo Bobonis, Paul Gertler, Marco Gonzalez-Navarro and Simeon Nichter

No 31266, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Does combating corruption reduce clientelism? We examine the impact of a prominent anti-corruption program on clientelism using a novel representative survey of rural Brazilians. Randomized audits reduce politicians’ provision of campaign handouts, decrease citizens’ demands for private goods, and reduce requests fulfilled by politicians. We investigate mechanisms by which audits may reduce clientelism, and find that audits significantly reduce citizens’ willingness to supply clientelist votes. Results also offer novel insights into audits’ dynamic effects: they have more pronounced effects in the short run, especially during electoral periods.

JEL-codes: O10 P37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc and nep-inv
Note: DEV LE POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Does Combating Corruption Reduce Clientelism? (2023)
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