Pack-Crack-Pack: Gerrymandering with Differential Turnout

Laurent Bouton, Garance Genicot, Micael Castanheira and Allison Stashko

No 31442, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper studies the manipulation of electoral maps by political parties, commonly referred to as gerrymandering. At the core of our analysis is the recognition that not all inhabitants of a district vote. This is important for gerrymandering as districts must have the same population size, but only voters matter for electoral outcomes. We propose a model of gerrymandering that allows for heterogeneity in voter turnout across individuals. This model reveals a new strategy for the gerrymanderers: the pattern is to pack-crack-pack along the turnout dimension. Specifically, parties benefit from packing low-turnout supporters and high-turnout opponents, while creating cracked districts that combine moderate-to-high-turnout supporters with lower-turnout opponents. These findings yield testable empirical implications about the relationship between partisan support, turnout rates, and electoral maps. Using a novel empirical strategy based on comparing maps proposed by Democrats and Republicans during the 2020 U.S. redistricting cycle, we test these predictions and find supporting evidence.

JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
Note: POL
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w31442.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Pack-Crack-Pack: Gerrymandering with Differential Turnout (2024)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:31442

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w31442

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().