Electoral College and Election Fraud

Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin

No 31474, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: One frequently overlooked aspect of the U.S.-style electoral college system is that it discourages election fraud. In a presidential election based on the popular vote, competing political parties are motivated to manipulate votes in areas where they hold the most significant influence, such as states where they control local executive offices, legislatures, and the judiciary. However, with the electoral college system in place, the incentives for fraud shift to swing states where the local government is politically divided, and fraud is therefore more difficult and costly. Our theoretical model elucidates why the electoral college system provides more effective protection against election fraud compared to the popular vote system. While polarization makes fraud more likely, it does not affect the superiority of the electoral college system.

JEL-codes: D73 D78 H83 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-07
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