Fallow Lengths and the Structure of Property Rights

Etienne Le Rossignol, Sara Lowes and Eduardo Montero

No 32226, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We study a fundamental institution in many societies: the structure of property rights over land. Across societies, communal land rights have been more common than private land rights. We test the hypothesis that longer fallow requirements – the time needed to leave land uncultivated to restore fertility based on ecological features of the soil and climate – led to a higher prevalence of communal property rights. Longer fallow requirements generate higher protection costs and therefore make communal rights more beneficial. We construct an ecological measure of the optimal fallow length for the most suitable staple crop across grid cells globally based on soil type, temperature, and climate. We find that places where land needs to be fallowed for longer periods are more likely to have communal property rights both historically and presently. We then examine the implications for efforts to title land. Using World Bank project ratings and academic impact evaluations, we find that land interventions are less effective and positive estimated impacts are systematically less common in settings with longer fallow requirements, suggesting a mismatch between development policy and the underlying context. Our results provide insights into the origins of property rights structures and the importance of aligning development policies with the cultural and institutional setting.

JEL-codes: O43 P14 Q15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr and nep-his
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Working Paper: Fallow Lengths and the Structure of Property Rights (2024)
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