Tunneling and Hidden Profits in Health Care

Ashvin Gandhi and Andrew Olenski

No 32258, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This study examines whether healthcare providers tunnel profits and assets to commonly-owned related parties by making inflated payments for their goods and services. Such practices allow providers to understate their profitability—which may encourage regulators to increase reimbursements and relax quality standards—and shield assets from malpractice liability. Using uniquely detailed nursing home financial data, we find evidence of widespread tunneling to related-party real estate and management companies. Our estimates suggest that 68% of nursing home profits are tunneled to related parties and that accounting for tunneled profits and assets raises the implied typical investment IRR from 4.83% to 13.11%.

JEL-codes: G3 I10 I11 L24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea
Note: EH
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