The Costs and Benefits of Clan Culture: Elite Control versus Cooperation in China

Shuo Chen, Raymond Fisman, Xiaohuan Lan, Yongxiang Wang and Qing Ye

No 32414, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Kinship ties are a common institution that may facilitate in-group coordination and cooperation. Yet their benefits – or lack thereof – depend crucially on the broader institutional environment. We study how the prevalence of clan ties affect how communities confronted two well-studied historical episodes from the early years of the People's Republic of China, utilizing four distinct proxies for county clan strength: the presence of recognized ancestral halls; genealogical records; rice suitability; and geographic latitude. We show that the loss of livestock associated with 1955-56 collectivization (which mandated that farmers surrender livestock for little compensation) documented by Chen and Lan (2017) was much less pronounced in strong-clan areas. By contrast, we show that the 1959-61 Great Famine was associated with higher mortality in areas with stronger clan ties. We argue that reconciling these two conflicting patterns requires that we take a broader view of how kinship groups interact with other governance institutions, in particular the role of kinship as a means of elite control.

JEL-codes: N95 P32 Z10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cna, nep-his and nep-soc
Note: DEV POL
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