The Moral Values of "Rugged Individualism"

Samuel Bazzi, Martin Fiszbein and Maximiliano Garcia

No 32433, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The United States is among the most individualistic societies in the world. However, unlike Western European individualism, which is imbued with moral universalism, America’s “rugged individualism” is instead particularistic. We link this distinctive cultural configuration to the country’s frontier history. The frontier favored self-reliance, but also rewarded cooperation, which could only be sustained through strong, local group identities. We show that counties with longer frontier history are more particularistic, displaying stronger opposition to federal taxes relative to state taxes, stronger communal values, less charitable giving to distant counties, and fewer online friendships with people in distant counties. At the same time, connections across counties display assortative matching on frontier history, highlighting the important role of culture in bridging disparate areas of the country. Overall, our results shed new light on moral values and the divergence of American and European individualism.

JEL-codes: N31 N91 O15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gro, nep-his and nep-soc
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