Demand-side and Supply-side Constraints in the Market for Financial Advice

Jonathan Reuter and Antoinette Schoar

No 32452, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: In this review, we argue that access to financial advice and the quality of this advice is shaped by a broad array of demand-side and supply-side constraints. While the literature has predominantly focused on conflicts of interest between advisors and clients, we highlight that the transaction costs of providing advice, mistaken beliefs on the demand side or supply side, and other factors can have equally detrimental effects on the quality and access to advice. Moreover, these factors affect how researchers should assess the impact of financial advice across heterogeneous groups of households. While households with low levels of financial literacy are more likely to benefit from advice—potentially including conflicted advice—they are also the least likely to detect misconduct, and perhaps the least likely to understand the value of paying for advice. Regulators should consider not only how regulation changes the quality of advice, but also the fraction of households who are able to receive it and how different groups would have invested without any advice. Financial innovation has the potential to provide customized advice at low cost, but also to embed conflicts of interest in algorithms that are opaque to households and regulators.

JEL-codes: G11 G4 G5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban and nep-fle
Note: AG AP CF
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w32452.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to the full text is generally limited to series subscribers, however if the top level domain of the client browser is in a developing country or transition economy free access is provided. More information about subscriptions and free access is available at http://www.nber.org/wwphelp.html. Free access is also available to older working papers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32452

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w32452
The price is Paper copy available by mail.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().