Leaders in Social Movements: Evidence From Unions in Myanmar

Laura E. Boudreau, Rocco Macchiavello, Virginia Minni and Mari Tanaka

No 32619, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Social movements are catalysts for crucial institutional changes. To succeed, they must coordinate members’ views (consensus building) and actions (mobilization). We study union leaders within Myanmar’s burgeoning labor movement. Union leaders are positively selected on both personality traits that enable them to influence others and ability but earn lower wages. In group discussions about workers’ views on an upcoming national minimum wage negotiation, randomly embedded leaders build consensus around the union’s preferred policy. In an experiment that mimics individual decision-making in a collective action set-up, leaders increase mobilization through coordination. Leaders empower social movements by building consensus that encourages mobilization.

JEL-codes: C93 D23 D70 J51 J52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-lab and nep-sea
Note: DEV LS POL
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