The Fiscal Contract up Close: Experimental Evidence from Mexico City

Anne Brockmeyer, Francisco Garfias and Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato

No 32776, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Can the provision of public goods strengthen the fiscal capacity of governments in developing countries and move them toward an equilibrium of widespread tax compliance? We present evidence of the impact of local public infrastructure on tax compliance, leveraging a large public investment experiment and individual property tax records from Mexico City. Despite the salience and large effects of these investments on access to infrastructure, property values, and local economic development, we find no changes in property tax compliance and can rule out even small increases. These null effects persist even when taxpayers are reminded about the tax-benefit link.

JEL-codes: H41 H71 O23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-iue, nep-pbe and nep-ure
Note: DEV PE POL
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: The Fiscal Contract up Close: Experimental Evidence from Mexico City (2024)
Working Paper: The Fiscal Contract up Close: Experimental Evidence from Mexico City (2024)
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