Crypto Tax Evasion

Tom G. Meling, Magne Mogstad and Arnstein Vestre

No 32865, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We quantify the extent of crypto tax noncompliance and evasion, and assess the efficacy of alternative tax enforcement interventions. The context of the study is Norway. This context allows us to address key measurement challenges by combining de-anonymized crypto trading data with individual tax returns, survey data, and information from tax enforcement interventions. We find that crypto tax noncompliance is pervasive, even among investors trading on exchanges that share identifiable trading data with tax authorities. However, since most crypto investors owe little in crypto-related taxes, enforcement strategies need to be well-targeted or cheap for benefits to outweigh costs.

JEL-codes: G5 H2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-iue, nep-pay, nep-pbe and nep-pub
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Working Paper: Crypto Tax Evasion (2024)
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