Monetary-Fiscal Coordination with International Hegemon

Xuning Ding and Zhengyang Jiang

No 33123, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Monetary and fiscal policies require coordination to achieve desired macroeconomic outcomes. The literature since Leeper (1991) has focused on two regimes: monetary dominance and fiscal dominance. In both cases, one policy is active while the other is passive and accommodates the former. We study this coordination problem in an international economy, and find a third regime—hegemon dominance. In this case, one country (the hegemon)'s monetary and fiscal authorities can pursue separate policy goals, while the other country's monetary and fiscal policies are both accommodative. For example, the hegemon can pursue a monetary policy unbacked by its fiscal policy. When this happens, the foreign monetary authority has to take the same stance as the hegemon, the foreign fiscal authority has to provide fiscal backing for the monetary stance undertaken by both countries, and the exchange rate adjusts to equilibrate the economy. Our result suggests that the U.S. fiscal policy's independence from its own monetary policy can be made possible by accommodative foreign policies, and that the Fed's effort to fight inflation can succeed despite the high level of public debt which would have required enormous fiscal backing in a closed economy.

JEL-codes: E52 E63 F33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mon and nep-opm
Note: AP EFG IFM ME
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w33123.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to the full text is generally limited to series subscribers, however if the top level domain of the client browser is in a developing country or transition economy free access is provided. More information about subscriptions and free access is available at http://www.nber.org/wwphelp.html. Free access is also available to older working papers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33123

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w33123
The price is Paper copy available by mail.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().