Forced Displacement, the Perpetuation of Autocratic Leaders, and Development in Origin Countries

Nicolas Cabra-Ruiz, Sandra Rozo and Maria Micaela Sviatschi

No 33131, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: When millions flee an autocratic regime, what happens to economic development in the country they leave behind? In Venezuela, nearly eight million people (38.8% of the population in 1990) have left since 2013. Using a difference-in-differences design exploiting historical foreign settlement shares (as migration networks) and post-2013 oil shocks, we find affected municipalities experienced a 29.4 percent GDP contraction (mirrored in lower income per capita and employment) and higher inequality at origin. Paradoxically, this exodus sustains autocracy by silencing political opposition and strengthening organized crime that channels illicit rents and armed enforcement to the regime. These linked economic and political shifts reveal how large-scale migration from weak institutional contexts can entrench autocracy and deepen long-run underdevelopment.

JEL-codes: O10 P0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-inv, nep-lab, nep-mig and nep-ure
Note: DEV POL
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