On International Cooperation

Bard Harstad

No 33161, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: A simple dynamic game is used for analyzing international environmental problems and climate agreements. Different countries are, over time, emitting as well as investing in green technology. In this framework, we can analyze the business-as-usual outcome, short vs. long term agreements, self-enforcing agreements, participation, compliance, alternative designs, and the development from the Kyoto Protocol to the Paris Agreement. The text should be accessible to students at any level.

JEL-codes: C72 F53 H87 Q2 Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env, nep-gth and nep-int
Note: EEE PE POL
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