Painful Bargaining: Evidence from Anesthesia Rollups

Aslihan Asil, Paulo Ramos, Amanda Starc and Thomas G. Wollmann

No 33217, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: A rollup is a series of acquisitions through which a financial sponsor consolidates ownership. Increasingly, this strategy is shaping economically important markets, but historically, it has escaped antitrust enforcement. We study this phenomenon in the anesthesia industry, site of the first rollup-based antitrust case in US history. First, we identify eighteen other rollups of anesthesia practices that are observationally similar to the three litigated ones. Next, we show that rollups consolidate ownership and prices rise sharply after competing practices are acquired. Last, we estimate a structural bargaining model and simulate counterfactual equilibria under various remedies.

JEL-codes: I11 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth and nep-his
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