The Complementarity Between Cities and State Capacity

Edward Glaeser

No 33247, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Public capacity complements urban density because externalities abound in cities and urban scale makes it possible to share infrastructure that needs to be managed. Yet, urban governments face limitations that are not experienced by private sector entities. A city cannot just stop policing if it decides it is bad at policing. Typically, public compensation and personnel policies are highly regulated either by law or by union contracts. City governments do, however, have one great advantage over private entities: a greater ability to learn from their peers. City governments do similar things throughout the world, while companies frequently specialize. Private companies have strong incentives to hide the trade secrets that make them more productive, cities do not. As individual cities do not have an incentive to make it easier for other governments to learn from them, multinational entities like the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank could enable that learning. Since climate-change-related crises are relatively rare events, city-to-city learning seems particularly important for adapting to climate change.

JEL-codes: O17 P14 R50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-sea and nep-ure
Note: LE PE
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w33247.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to the full text is generally limited to series subscribers, however if the top level domain of the client browser is in a developing country or transition economy free access is provided. More information about subscriptions and free access is available at http://www.nber.org/wwphelp.html. Free access is also available to older working papers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33247

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w33247
The price is Paper copy available by mail.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().