When Democracy Refuses to Die: Evaluating a Training Program for New Politicians

Ernesto Dal Bó, Claudio Ferraz, Frederico Finan and Pedro Pessoa

No 33251, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We evaluate the effects of a program in Brazil that selects and trains new politicians, addressing three main challenges: selection bias from program screening, self-selection into candidacy, and the need to quantify the contributions of both selection and training in a holistic evaluation. Our findings show that the program raised political entry by doubling candidacy rates and increasing electoral success by 69%. However, much of the overall effect was driven by screening, which accounted for 30% of the increase in candidacy and 43% of the increase in election rates, while also making the candidate pool more diverse, competent, and committed to democratic values. Renewing the political class involves trade-offs, as some traits favored by the program did not align with voter preferences, and also reduced the descriptive representation of low-income individuals.

JEL-codes: D72 P0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
Note: DEV POL
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