Cracks in the Glass Ceiling and Gender Equality: Do Exports Shatter the Glass Ceiling?
Bruno César Araújo,
Lourenco Paz and
James West
No 33260, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
Do female managers improve workplace outcomes for female employees? The evidence is mixed. We use Brazilian administrative employer-employee matched data over the large and unanticipated 1999 Brazilian real exchange rate devaluation and find that the share of female employees grows in female-led firms, but the male-female wage gap grows in both female- and male-led firms. This behavior is inconsistent with both theoretical models of taste-based employer discrimination and third-degree oligopsonistic labor markets by gender. Outcomes only differ between female- and male-led firms regarding managerial and supervisory employees, where female-led firms hire more female managerial and supervisory employees, yet the gender wage gap widens relative to male-led firms. We conclude that exports further crack the glass ceiling in female-led firms, though at the cost of a more expansive gender wage gap.
JEL-codes: F12 J16 J31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gen, nep-hrm and nep-lab
Note: ITI LS
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w33260.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to the full text is generally limited to series subscribers, however if the top level domain of the client browser is in a developing country or transition economy free access is provided. More information about subscriptions and free access is available at http://www.nber.org/wwphelp.html. Free access is also available to older working papers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33260
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w33260
The price is Paper copy available by mail.
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().