Revenue-Sharing Teams with Remote Workers

E. Dutcher and Krista J. Saral

No 33321, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Remote work policies remain controversial because of the perceived opportunity for increased shirking outside of the traditional office; a problem that is potentially exacerbated if employees work in a revenue-sharing team environment. Using a controlled experiment, where individuals are randomized to different work locations (remote or an office-like setting), we examine how remote work impacts effort choices under individual pay schemes and in revenue sharing teams. Treatments vary the number of remote workers on a team. Our results suggest that work location alone does not lead to productivity differences. However, the location of partners does impact an individual’s effort levels in revenue-sharing teams. Non-remote workers reduce effort as the number of remote partners increases, and remote workers increase effort as the number of remote workers increases. These results are driven predominantly by those who are relatively less productive as individuals. Post-experiment incentivized survey evidence points to expectations of partner productivity as a contributing factor.

JEL-codes: C9 J21 J24 J28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-lma
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