Strategic Commitments to Decarbonize: The Role of Large Firms, Common Ownership, and Governments

Viral Acharya, Robert Engle and Olivier Wang

No 33335, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We study how government policies and corporate commitments to decarbonize interact under two externalities: environmental damages and green innovation spillovers. Unconstrained carbon taxes and innovation subsidies could achieve first-best outcomes, but when government policies face constraints, commitments by large firms and institutional investors can serve as profit-driven coordination devices that spur green innovation and technology adoption, and thereby reduce overall transition costs. Firm commitments also enhance government policy credibility by lowering the need for high future carbon taxes. Our empirical evidence confirms that firm size and green common ownership drive Net Zero commitments and decarbonization investments.

JEL-codes: G3 H2 Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cse, nep-ene, nep-env and nep-sbm
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