Voluntary Accreditation and Healthcare Quality: Evidence from a Randomized Controlled Trial in U.S. Jails

Marcella Alsan and Crystal Yang

No 33357, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We study whether voluntary accreditation improves healthcare quality in U.S. jails, where publicly financed care is often delivered by private contractors and overseen by elected sheriffs with limited medical expertise. We conduct the first randomized controlled trial of healthcare accreditation in the United States, randomizing the offer of accreditation to 46 jails. Assignment improves compliance with quality standards, particularly in training and patient care, without increasing capital or labor inputs, and substantially reduces 12-month mortality. Descriptively, mortality reductions are concentrated in jails with the largest quality improvements. Evidence suggests effects operate through improved coordination, screening, and oversight.

JEL-codes: I1 I14 I18 I3 K10 K14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-01
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