Gun Policy and the Steel Paradox: Evidence from Oregunians

Katie Bollman, Benjamin Hansen, Edward Rubin and Garrett O. Stanford

No 33360, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Using Measure 114’s narrow passage in Oregon as a natural experiment, we study how new gun regulations affect firearm demand. Background checks, a proxy for demand, rose 13.9% in anticipation of the referendum and surged 157% immediately following the election. After judicial intervention halted the law’s enactment, demand returned near pre-election levels. Temporal displacement/harvesting does not explain the demand spike: after eighteen months, we still observe a substantial cumulative increase of 63,000 excess firearm-related background checks. Administrative data reveal significant county-level heterogeneity. This evidence underscores the paradoxical effect of gun-control policies, offering a cautionary lesson to policymakers.

JEL-codes: H8 I18 I28 K23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac and nep-ure
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