Does Peer Review Penalize Scientific Risk Taking? Evidence from NIH Grant Renewals

Pierre Azoulay and Wesley H. Greenblatt

No 33495, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Scientific projects that carry a high degree of risk may be more likely to lead to breakthroughs yet also face challenges in winning the support necessary to be carried out. We analyze the determinants of renewal for more than 100,000 R01 grants from the National Institutes of Health between 1980 and 2015. We use four distinct proxies to measure risk taking: extreme tail outcomes, disruptiveness, pivoting from an investigator’s prior work, and standing out from the crowd in one’s field. After carefully controlling for investigator, grant, and institution characteristics, we measure the association between risk taking and grant renewal. Across each of these measures, we find that risky grants are renewed at markedly lower rates than less risky ones. We also provide evidence that the magnitude of the risk penalty is magnified for more novel areas of research and novice investigators, consistent with the academic community’s perception that current scientific institutions do not motivate exploratory research adequately.

JEL-codes: H51 O32 O38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea, nep-ppm, nep-rmg and nep-sog
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