Bidding for Talent: A Test of Conduct in a High-Wage Labor Market

Nina Roussille and Benjamin Scuderi

No 33848, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We develop a procedure for adjudicating between models of firm wage-setting conduct. Using data from a U.S. job search platform, we propose a methodology to aggregate workers’ choices over menus of jobs into rankings of firms’ non-wage amenities. We use these estimates to formulate a test of conduct based on exclusion restrictions. Oligopsonistic models incorporating strategic interactions between firms and tailoring of wage offers to workers’ outside options are rejected in favor of monopsonistic models featuring near-uniform markdowns. Misspecification has meaningful consequences: our preferred model predicts average markdowns of 19.5%, while others predict average markdowns as large as 26.6%.

JEL-codes: J31 J42 L21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lma
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