Decoupling Taste-Based versus Statistical Discrimination in Elections

Amanda de Albuquerque, Frederico Finan, Anubhav Jha, Laura Karpuska and Francesco Trebbi

No 33859, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We present a methodology for decoupling taste-based versus statistical discrimination in political behavior. We combine a flexible empirical model of voting, featuring vertical and horizontal candidate differentiation in gender, ability, and policy positions, with a large-scale micro-targeted electoral experiment aimed at increasing female candidate vote shares. Our structural econometric approach allows to separately identify preference parameters driving taste-based discrimination and beliefs parameters driving statistical discrimination through expectations about ability and policy positions of female politicians. Our application to Brazilian municipal elections uncovers substantial levels of taste-based and statistical discrimination. Counterfactual political campaigns show promise in reducing both.

JEL-codes: D72 P0 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lma
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