Collusion through Common Leadership

Alejandro Herrera-Caicedo, Jessica Jeffers and Elena Prager

No 33866, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper studies whether common leadership, defined as two firms sharing executives or board directors, contributes to collusion. Using an explicit measure of labor market collusion from unsealed court evidence, we find that the probability of collusion between two firms increases by 11 percentage points after the onset of common leadership, a ninefold increase over the baseline rate. These results are not driven by closeness of product or labor market competition. Our findings are consistent with the increasing attention toward common leadership under Clayton Act Section 8.

JEL-codes: K21 L4 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-law
Note: CF IO LE
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w33866.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33866

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w33866

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().