Do Physicians Follow the Golden Rule? Evidence of Imperfect Agency and Moral Hazard from Physicians’ Self-Prescriptions

Mariana Carrera and Niels Skipper

No 33954, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Using data on prescriptions for cholesterol-lowering drugs (statins), we study differences in the treatments chosen by Danish physicians for themselves versus for their patients. We estimate that physicians discount patient health benefit relative to their own, valuing the additional potency of a stronger statin by significantly more if it is for their own use. We exploit variation in expected coinsurance to estimate that moral hazard accounts for a modest share, no more than 15%, of this additional valuation. Statin-using physicians also respond more quickly to a patent expiration, suggesting greater effort to stay informed on drug classes they personally use.

JEL-codes: D82 I13 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-06
Note: EH
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