Borrowing Constraints, Markups, and Misallocation

Huiyu Li, Chen Lian, Yueran Ma and Emily Martell

No 33960, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We document new facts that link firms’ markups to borrowing constraints: (1) less constrained firms within an industry have higher markups, especially in industries where assets are difficult to borrow against and firms rely more on earnings to borrow; (2) markup dispersion is also higher in industries where firms rely more on earnings to borrow. We explain these relationships using a standard Kimball demand model augmented with borrowing against assets and earnings. The key mechanism is a two-way feedback between markups and borrowing constraints. First, less constrained firms charge higher markups, as looser constraints allow them to attain larger market shares. Second, higher markups relax borrowing constraints when firms rely on earnings to borrow, as those with higher markups have higher earnings. This two-way feedback lowers TFP losses from markup dispersion, particularly when firms rely on earnings to borrow.

JEL-codes: E22 E23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-06
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