Asset Returns as Carbon Taxes
Lautaro Chittaro,
Monika Piazzesi,
Marcelo J. Sena and
Martin Schneider
No 34342, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
In frictionless financial markets, a carbon tax on energy users provides the same incentives as a replicating asset price schedule that depends on emissions. In particular, the replicating rate of return on a firm increases linearly in scope 1 emissions relative to enterprise value. We use this result to interpret pollution premia measured by recent empirical studies and conclude that markets currently provide only modest incentives. Replicating a serious carbon tax requires high returns in the right tail of the emission intensity distribution. With heterogeneous investors, such returns are not sustainable unless essentially everyone perceives large nonpecuniary costs from holding dirty capital. Substantial emission reductions can be achieved, however, when even a small share of investors perceive nonpecuniary benefits from owning clean electricity capital.
JEL-codes: E0 G0 Q0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene and nep-env
Note: AP EEE EFG ME
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w34342.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to the full text is generally limited to series subscribers, however if the top level domain of the client browser is in a developing country or transition economy free access is provided. More information about subscriptions and free access is available at http://www.nber.org/wwphelp.html. Free access is also available to older working papers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:34342
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w34342
The price is Paper copy available by mail.
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().