Repeated Matching Games An Empirical Framework

Pauline Corblet, Jeremy Fox and Alfred Galichon

No 34352, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We introduce a model of dynamic matching with transferable utility, extending the static model of Shapley and Shubik (1971). Forward-looking agents have individual states that evolve with current matches. Each period, a matching market with market-clearing prices takes place. We prove the existence of an equilibrium with time-varying distributions of agent types and show it is the solution to a social planner’s problem. We also prove that a stationary equilibrium exists. We introduce econometric shocks to account for unobserved heterogeneity in match formation. We propose two algorithms to compute a stationary equilibrium. We adapt both algorithms for estimation. We estimate a model of accumulation of job-specific human capital using data on Swedish engineers.

JEL-codes: C1 C78 J20 L10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-lma and nep-upt
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