Repression

Gerard Padró I Miquel and Nancy Qian

No 34926, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We develop a conceptual framework of political repression. To motivate why states repress, we introduce the notion of the political project. The proposed framework is used to interpret two known stylized facts: 1) repression is higher in autocracies; and 2) repression has declined since the 1990s. We discuss under-researched aspects of political repression such as migration restrictions, the targeting of repression, and backlash. We conclude by bringing attention to the two main challenges for research on repression: 1) conceptualizing whether a given episode of repression is successful, and 2) the inherent selection problem in empirical measures of repression.

JEL-codes: P0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
Note: POL
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