EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Adversarial Selection

Alma Cohen, Alon Klement, Zvika Neeman and Eilon Solan

No 35031, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: In many institutional settings, k items are selected with the goal of representing the underlying distribution of claims, opinions, or characteristics in a large population. We study environments with two adversarial parties whose preferences over the selected items are commonly known and opposed. We propose the Quantile Mechanism: one party partitions the population into k disjoint subsets, and the other selects one item from each subset. We show that this procedure is optimally representative among all feasible mechanisms, and illustrate its use in jury selection, multi-district litigation, and committee formation.

JEL-codes: C7 D7 D82 K4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
Note: LE PE POL
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w35031.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to the full text is generally limited to series subscribers, however if the top level domain of the client browser is in a developing country or transition economy free access is provided. More information about subscriptions and free access is available at http://www.nber.org/wwphelp.html. Free access is also available to older working papers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35031

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w35031
The price is Paper copy available by mail.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().

 
Page updated 2026-04-13
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35031