If You Build It, They May Not Come: Willingness to Participate in Managed EV Charging

Fiona Burlig, James Bushnell and David Rapson

No 35086, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Despite the importance of program participation for policy, treatment effects are often measured on self-selected samples. We study electric vehicle (EV) managed charging, intended to reduce electric grid strain by optimally allocating charging across EVs. Prior work finds large impacts of managed charging among households who volunteer for an RCT. In contrast, we test managed charging with an experiment including all EVs within a California utility. Enrollment is low even with high incentives, and we can reject even modest intent-to-treat effects on electricity consumption. Managed charging is less effective than previously thought, underscoring the value of population-wide experiments.

JEL-codes: C90 Q40 R40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm, nep-ene, nep-exp and nep-tre
Note: EEE
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Working Paper: If You Build It, They May Not Come: Willingness to Participate in Managed EV Charging (2026)
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