Opt In? Opt Out?

Alex Chan, Ayush Gupta and Yetong Xu

No 35169, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Cadaveric organ shortages leave thousands without life-saving transplants each year. Countries differ in using opt-in (informed consent) or opt-out (presumed consent) systems for donor registration. Using newly assembled cross-country panel data and an event-study design, this paper provides evidence that presumed-consent laws increase organ donation only when strictly enforced and family veto power is limited; weak opt-out regimes show negligible or even negative effects. A theoretical signaling model provides a plausible mechanism when opt-in or opt-out yields more donations, emphasizing the roles of donation propensity, signaling costs, and the family’s ability to overturn defaults. A large laboratory experiment further tests these mechanisms, showing that opt-in generally produces equal or higher donation rates unless signaling is costly and family veto power is minimal. The results underscore that defaults alone rarely increase donations unless paired with strong institutional enforcement.

JEL-codes: C91 C92 D47 D64 H00 I11 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-05
Note: EH LE PE
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