Competitive Exposure and Entrepreneurial Experimentation

Joshua Gans

No 35172, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Should a startup test in public? A visible experiment can attract customers, investors, and suppliers. It also tells a rival that the venture has passed a development gate. This paper studies an entrepreneur who chooses the visibility of sequential validation activities while a potential competitor decides whether to enter before launch or wait. When some favourable public results are not enough to trigger entry, but more are, the entrepreneur may validate publicly first and quietly second. An initial public success builds the venture without sacrificing its lead, but spends part of its competitive exposure budget—the amount of favourable public evidence that can become attributable before early entry is triggered. If a later public test succeeds, its public record would reveal both its own result and the progress required to undertake it, exhausting the remaining balance. Secrecy delays competition rather than avoiding it. The baseline gives public and quiet tests the same private informativeness to isolate this mechanism. An extension allows public testing to reject bad ventures more reliably. Quiet testing then raises the probability that a bad venture reaches launch, but remains optimal when the preserved launch lead and saved public-testing cost outweigh the traction and screening gained from publicity. Visibility can, therefore, fall as the entrepreneur becomes more confident even though doing so makes a mistaken launch more likely.

JEL-codes: O30 O33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-exp and nep-ino
Note: PR
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