Credibility and Precommitment in Socialist Constitutionalism

Sebastian Edwards

No 35200, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: In this paper I examine Chile’s 1972 initiative to draft a new constitution under President Salvador Allende. I analyze the political and economic circumstances that gave rise to the project and the institutional mechanisms through which the draft sought to advance a socialist economic and political program centered on state ownership of means of production and central planning. I compare the Chilean proposal with the socialist constitutions of the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia. The draft, which was never submitted to a plebiscite, as Allende envisioned, subsequently disappeared and remained unavailable for nearly two decades. Remarkably, the proposal has attracted very limited scholarly attention.

JEL-codes: K10 K16 K19 N46 P37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-05
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