Unilateral-Veto Mechanisms

Quitzé Valenzuela-Stookey, E. Jason Baron and Richard Lombardo

No 35383, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Unilateral vetoes, in which an agent takes an action that restricts the set of possible outcomes for themselves independent of what other agents do, are a frequently used tool in real-world approaches to multi-dimensional screening. We study how this tool works in a class of task-allocation problems. We characterize obvious strategy-proofness of unilateral-veto mechanisms, yielding structural insights into how veto rights shape incentives: obviously strategy-proof mechanisms consist of diverse menus of narrowly defined rights. We then examine the potential of this simple class of mechanisms as a practical market-design tool and provide empirical evidence of their efficacy in two applications.

JEL-codes: C78 D47 D61 D82 J45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-06
Note: IO LS PE
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