Meritocracy and the Networks It Forged: China’s Imperial Examination

Ying Bai and Ruixue Jia

No 35556, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Institutions that claim to reward merit often also serve as engines that drive the formation of important social networks. We examine this dual role in China’s Imperial Examination, one of history’s longest-lived meritocratic systems. We draw on exam performance data for 24,269 individuals across 112 national examinations in the Qing dynasty (1644–1905) and trace who among them rose to become top officials. Strong exam performance increased the likelihood of attaining high office, but advancement also depended on individuals’ ties to powerful examiners. Because performance and ties to powerful examiners were strongly complementary, individuals’ success appeared to rest on merit even as social networks played a role. Following the major political transformations of the 1840s, the importance of examiner ties persisted, although the influential examiners themselves changed. These findings help explain why such systems retain legitimacy even when networks matter greatly.

JEL-codes: D73 D85 N45 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-07
Note: ED PE POL
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