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Signals, Steps, and Setbacks: Age Discrimination in a Laddered Labor Market

Shuaizhang Feng, Lars Lefgren, Jieyi Liu, Brennan Platt and Xiaoyu Xia

No 35709, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We study age discrimination in a labor market with a job ladder, where worker productivity is revealed over time. Using data from a large Chinese recruitment platform that links job postings, applications, and employer responses, we document sharp declines in applications and callbacks at posted age cutoffs. Discrimination operates in both directions: older applicants are disadvantaged in entry-level jobs, while younger applicants are less likely to be hired into managerial roles. A model of statistical discrimination with imperfect signal screening explains these patterns. Consistent with the model, older applicants to entry-level jobs are negatively selected relative to their peers.

JEL-codes: J71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-09
Note: AG LS
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