Strategic Sovereignty: U.S.–Israeli Strikes and the Reversal of Anti-Regime Protest in Iran

Sultan Mehmood, Yaroslav Prokhorskoy and Leonard Wantchekon

No 35734, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Can foreign intervention redirect domestic mobilization toward the regime it seeks to weaken? We study the 2026 U.S.–Israeli strikes on Iran, which occurred amid a nationwide anti-government uprising. Combining high-frequency geocoded data on protests with geocoded records of U.S.–Israeli strikes, we document a sharp reversal in political mobilization. Anti-government protest was widespread before the strikes and receded sharply through February amid domestic repression and an intensifying “foreign-agent” narrative. Following the strikes, pro-government rallies and protests against the United States and Israel spread across the country. Exploiting the precise location and staggered timing of counties’ first exposure to a U.S.–Israeli strike, we find little change in total protest activity but a sharp shift from anti-government to pro-government protest. Public statements by U.S. and Israeli leaders increasingly aligned themselves with the protest movement, while Iranian officials portrayed the unrest as foreign-backed. These patterns are consistent with strategic sovereignty: overt foreign intervention can make domestic opposition easier to portray as aligned with an external adversary, weakening its legitimacy and redirecting collective action toward defense of the state.

JEL-codes: H56 H89 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-09
Note: POL
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