Insuring Landlords

Thomas Bézy, Antoine B. Levy and Timothy McQuade

No 35932, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper shows that insuring landlords against non-payment risk can improve housing access and upward geographic mobility for fragile tenants. We study Visale, a large-scale publicly funded rent guarantee insurance policy in France, free for eligible tenants and landlords. Using administrative household and claim payout data and quasi-experimental eligibility variation by exact age, we show the guarantee increased access to private-sector rental housing, especially for immigrants, newly formed households, and low-income renters. The scheme eased long-distance mobility toward expensive, high-wage neighborhoods at a moderate fiscal cost per marginal move, though potentially displacing comparable ineligible tenants through higher rents.

JEL-codes: G5 H31 R30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur and nep-hre
Note: PE
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