Voluntary Export Restraints on Automobiles: Evaluating a Strategic TradePolicy

Steven Berry (), James Levinsohn and Ariel Pakes

No 5235, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: In May, 1981, a voluntary export restraint (VER) was placed on exports of automobiles from Japan to the United States. As trade policies go, this one was important. At about the same time, though to much less fanfare, international trade theorists were obtaining (then) startling results from models of international trade in imperfectly competitive markets. These models suggested that in imperfectly competitive markets, an activist trade policy might enhance national welfare. In this paper, we provide some empirical evidence on whether these new theoretical possibilities might actually apply to the policy of VERs.

Date: 1995-08
Note: IO ITI PR
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

Published as American Economic Review, Vol.89, no. 3 (1999): 400-430.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w5235.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Voluntary Export Restraints on Automobiles: Evaluating a Strategic Trade Policy (1997)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:5235

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w5235

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().