Debt and Monetary Policy: The Policy Issues
Rüdiger Dornbusch
No 5573, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
The paper explores the implications of high debt for monetary policy. In Europe, debt (and deficits) play a special role at present in the run up to Maastricht because large debts are seen as a threat to the integrity of the new European money. The paper reviews two historical episodes-- the German, UK, and French experience in the 1920s and the US debt liquidation of the 1950-1980 period. The theoretical review focuses on hypotheses of Keynes, Clark and Sargent- Wallace. The paper adds to the range of concerns private balance sheet vulnerability.
JEL-codes: E5 E6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996-05
Note: IFM ME
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)
Published as Calvo, Guillermo and Mervyn King. The debt burden and its consequences for monetary policy: Proceedings of a conference held by the International Economic Association at the Deutsche Bundesbank, Frankfurt, Germany, IEA Conference Volume, no. 118. New York: St. Martin's Press; London: Macmillan Press; in association with the International Economic Association, 1998.
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Chapter: Debt and Monetary Policy: The Policy Issues (1998)
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