Auction Design and the Market for Sulfur Dioxide Emissions

Paul Joskow, Richard Schmalensee and Elizabeth M. Bailey

No 5745, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 created a market for electric utility emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO2). Recent papers have argued that flaws in the design of the auctions that are part of this market have adversely affected its performance. These papers incorrectly assume that trade can only occur at auctions, however. Our empirical analysis of the SO2 emissions market shows that the auctions have become a small part of a relatively efficient market and that the auction design problems that have attracted the most attention have had no effect on actual market prices

JEL-codes: D44 Q25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996-09
Note: IO
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Published as (Published as "The Market for Sulfur Dioxide Emissions) American Economic Review, Vol. 88, no. 4 (September 1998): 669-685.

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