The Choice of Organizational Form in Gasoline Retailing and The Costs of Laws Limiting that Choice

Asher Blass () and Dennis Carlton

No 7435, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper uses a new data source to analyze the choice of organizational form of retail gasoline stations. In recent years, gasoline stations have tended to be less likely to be owned and operated by a lessee dealer and more likely to be owned and operated by the refiner. Critics have alleged that company-operated stations are used to drive lessee dealer stations out of business in order to restrict competition. We examine the determinants of organizational form and find them to be based on efficiency not predatory concerns. We estimate the costs of recent laws prohibiting company ownership of gasoline stations.

Date: 1999-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene and nep-ind
Note: IO
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published as Blass, Asher A. and Dennis W. Carlton. "The Choice Of Organizational Form In Gasoline Retailing And The Cost Of Laws That Limit Choice," Journal of Law and Economics, 2001, v44(2,Oct), 511-524.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7435.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:7435

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7435

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().